Since the 2000 U.S. Presidential election, social scientists have rediscovered a long tradition of research that investigates the effects of ballot format on voting. Using a new dataset collected by the New York Times, we investigate the causal effect of being listed on the first ballot page in the 2003 California gubernatorial recall election. California law mandates a unique randomization procedure of ballot order that, when appropriately modeled, can be used to approximate a classical randomized experiment in a real world setting. We apply (nonparametric) randomization inference based on Fisher's exact test, which directly incorporates the actual randomization procedure and yields accurate confidence intervals. Our results suggest that over forty percent of the minor candidates gained more votes when listed on the first page of the ballot, while there is no significant effect for top two candidates. We also investigate how randomization inference differs from conventional estimators that do not fully incorporate California's complex treatment assignment mechanism. The results indicate appreciable differences between the two approaches.
Introduction
In the 2000 U.S. national election, George W. Bush became President by winning 537 more votes than Al Gore in Florida. Not only did this unusually close election appear to challenge theoretical and empirical propositions that individual voters are rarely decisive (e.g., Riker and Ordeshook, 1968; Aldrich, 1993; Gelman, King, and Boscarding, 1998) , but the election also served as a reminder that the manner in which elections are administered can change their outcomes. Indeed, the 2000 election spawned a host of scholarly and official investigations into the causal effects of various administrative factors on election outcomes. These factors include the butterfly ballot (Wand et al., 2001) , voting equipment (US General Accounting Office, 2001; Tomz and Van Houweling, 2003) , overseas absentee ballots (Imai and King, 2004) , undervotes (Hansen, 2003) , and the ballot order of candidates (Krosnick, Miller, and Tichy, 2003; Ho and Imai, 2004) . The election debacle of Bush v. Gore also prompted election reform across the United States. Congress authorized nearly four billion dollars for voting reform with the Help America Vote Act in 2002 alone.
While the 2000 election highlighted the importance of election administration and ballot format in particular, legal scholars, political scientists, and psychologists have long been interested in examining the causal effects of ballot format on election outcomes (e.g., Gold, 1952; Bain and Hecock, 1957; Scott, 1972; Darcy, 1986; Darcy and McAllister, 1990; Miller and Krosnick, 1998) . However, extant studies typically employ observational data, in which the assessment of causal effects is subject to potential confounding factors, and laboratory experiments, in which results may lack external validity. We address these shortcomings by analyzing a randomized natural experiment.
Because randomized experiments in real elections are difficult to conduct for ethical and practical reasons, natural experiments provide rare opportunities to make valid causal inferences.
In particular, we study the causal effect of the page placement of candidates in the 2003 California recall election using a unique data set that was collected by the New York Times (Kershaw, 2003) . Since 1975, California law has mandated that the Secretary of State draw a random alphabet for each election to determine the order of candidates for the first assembly district (California Elections Code 2003, Section 13112) . The law further requires this candidate order to be systemati-1 cally rotated throughout the remaining assembly districts. We exploit this randomization-rotation procedure to estimate the causal effect of being listed on the first ballot page on a candidate's vote share. This question is important from two perspectives. First, from a behavioral voting perspective, our study investigates whether voters are able to act as if they are fully-informed (e.g., Bartels, 1996; Forsythe, Myerson, Rietz, and Weber, 1993) . Second, from a policy-making perspective, ballot design is seen as central to electoral fairness and design (e.g., Garrett, 2004 , and "Making Vote Count" series of New York Times Editorials on Voting Fairness, 2004) .
The analysis of the 2003 California recall election also poses unique statistical challenges. First, treatment assignment is randomized but in an unconventional way. The units of randomization are the alphabet letters rather than candidates, and the randomization is followed by systematic rotation of the candidate order through 80 non-randomly ordered assembly districts. Second, the 58 counties in California each print unique ballots, and an assembly district may contain more than one county and/or only a part of a county. Third, the unusually high level of media attention and low threshold of ballot access led to an unprecedented total of 135 candidates, from Hollywood actor Arnold Schwarzenegger, who eventually won the election, to child television star Gary Coleman.
Challenges arise primarily out of the fact that the randomization-rotation procedure was designed by policy makers for ease of implementation, not ease of statistical estimation. Therefore, careful statistical analysis is required to draw valid causal inferences. Given the peculiarity of the recall election, we limit ourselves to in-sample inferences. A comprehensive analysis of other California elections appears elsewhere (Ho and Imai, 2004) .
To address these challenges, we apply (nonparametric) randomization inference, which was originally developed by Fisher (1935) and later extended by others (see e.g., Cox and Reid, 2000; Rosenbaum, 2002c , and references therein). More recently, randomization inference has been applied to observational studies (e.g., Rosenbaum, 2002a,b) and instrumental variables (e.g., Rosenbaum, 1996; Greevy et al., 2004; Imbens and Rosenbaum, 2005) . Our application illustrates that randomization inference may be applied to various treatment assignment mechanisms, such as the alphabet randomization of the 1970 Vietnam draft lottery (Starr, 1997; Angrist, 1990) , randomization-rotation commonly applied to reduce survey question order effects in psychology 2 (Shaughnessy et al., 2002, Ch. 7) , or sequential randomization on covariates in clinical trials (Pocock and Simon, 1975) .
We first use an extension of Fisher's exact test to examine the sharp null hypothesis of no ballot page effect. The result suggests that being placed on the first page of ballot significantly increases vote shares for over 40% of the candidates. Contrary to conventional estimators, we find (a) that page placement does not decrease vote shares and (b) no significant effects of page placement for the top two candidates. This finding is consistent with one of the main results we obtained when analyzing the causal effect of being placed first on the ballot (rather than being placed on the first page) in other California general elections (see Ho and Imai, 2004) . Next, we invert Fisher's exact test to obtain approximate nonparametric confidence intervals for ballot page effects.
The article proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we explain the randomization-rotation procedure mandated by California law. We also describe our dataset of the 2003 California recall election.
In Section 3, we place our analysis in a statistical framework of causal inference, and explain how Fisher's exact test can be extended to conduct distribution-free hypothesis testing about causal effects. We also show how to obtain nonparametric confidence intervals of quantities of interest by inverting the test. In Section 4, we present the results of our analysis based on randomization inference, conduct sensitivity analyses, and compare randomization inference with conventional estimators that do not fully incorporate the treatment assignment mechanism. Section 5 concludes.
The Randomization Procedure and Data
In this section, we briefly explain the randomization procedure employed for California statewide elections. We also describe our dataset of California ballots, which was originally collected by the New York Times. In addition, we obtained official election returns, voter registration data, and Census data.
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The California Alphabet Lottery
Until 1975, incumbents appeared first on the ballot in most California statewide elections. Then, the California Supreme Court ruled in Gould v. Grubb, 14 Cal. 3d 661 (Cal., 1975) , that listing candidates by incumbency or alphabetical order was unconstitutional (see, e.g., Scott, 1972) . In response, the California legislature passed a randomization procedure to determine the order of candidates. According to California Elections Code § 13112 (2003) , the alphabet lottery works in three steps. First, the Secretary of State randomly draws the letters of the alphabet so that all 26! possible permutations of the alphabet are equally possible. Second, names of candidates for each statewide office are ordered by this randomized alphabet for the first of 80 assembly districts.
Third, candidate names are systematically rotated for each subsequent assembly district. That is, the candidate listed first in a district moves to the last place in the next district, and all the other candidates move upward by one position. In a typical race with 5 to 7 candidates, for example, this would ensure that all candidates are listed roughly an equal number of times.
For the 2003 recall election, the actual randomized alphabet was,
Based on this randomized alphabet, the ballot order in the first assembly district was determined, starting from Robinson, Roscoe, Ramirez, and so on up to Lewis and Leonard. This candidate order was then rotated throughout the remaining assembly districts. Ho and Imai (2004) first used the California alphabet lottery to estimate the causal effect of ballot order on candidates for the statewide elections from 1978 to 2002. Their statistical tests confirmed that the resulting alphabets from the California alphabet lottery were indeed random (see also Figure 3 for tests to show the complete randomization of page-placement in the recall data). Ho and Imai (2004) also identified several statistical challenges. Most importantly, the randomization-rotation procedure poses difficulties in identifying the variance of conventional estimators such as the difference-in-means estimator and the linear regression estimator. Ho and Imai (2004) pointed out that a similar situation arises in systematic sampling in surveys: the fact that randomization in systematic sampling occurs only once makes identification of the variance 4 difficult without distributional assumptions about the population order (see e.g., Cochran, 1977, chap.8; Wolter, 1984) .
In our application, this variance identification problem is exacerbated because the population order of the California districts is non-random, its distribution is unknown, and the number of districts (121) is small relative to the number of candidates (135). Moreover, the unit of randomization is not the page position of a candidate, but rather the alphabet, and ballot pages vary across counties. This leads to unequal probability treatment assignment that may be confounded, while making the identification of standard variance estimators even more difficult. Ho and Imai (2004) found that in typical California elections these challenges are not severe when analyzing the effect of being listed first on the (one-page) ballot (rather than the effect of being placed on the first page of the multi-page ballot). This is because in contrast to the recall election, the number of candidates in typical elections is small (generally around 5) relative to the number of districts, and so the randomization-rotation procedure leads to a good balance of observed district characteristics and roughly equal probability assignment. does not contain the placement of candidate names within each ballot page.) The dataset is comprised of geographical units defined by counties and assembly districts. Each of the 58 counties employs different ballot formats with a different number of pages, and the candidate order differs by each of 80 assembly districts. Therefore, the page in which the name of each candidate appears depends on both (a) the number of ballot pages decided by each county registrar, which is not randomized, and (b) the ballot order in each of the 80 assembly districts, which is determined by randomized alphabet and systematic rotation.
The Recall Election Dataset
For example, both Del Norte county and Humboldt county belong to the first assembly district.
While Humboldt county uses a one-page ballot, listing all 135 candidates together on one page, Del 5 Norte county uses a five-page ballot, listing only 23 candidates on the first page. Butte county is split into two assembly districts, and as a result, Schwarzenegger is listed on the fourth page in the second assembly district while his name appears on the third page in the third assembly district. In total, we have 158 unique assembly-district-counties, out of which 121 units have ballots with more than one page. For simplicity, we shall refer to these geographical units as "districts" throughout the remainder of the article. These 121 districts serve as the units of our analysis. We exclude the districts with one-page ballots because for these districts the in-sample causal effect of being listed on the first page cannot be defined.
The New York Times data contain information on the page placement of 135 candidates in each district, while the data from the California Secretary of State Office provide certified election returns of all candidates and party registration rates (i.e., the number of registered Republican or Democratic voters divided by the total number of registered voters) in each district. Using the 2000 Census, we also collected data on income (mean household wage or salary income in 1999), and gender and racial compositions (proportions of male, whites, Asians, Latinos, and AfricanAmericans for each district, all of which take a value between 0 and 1). There variables are proper pretreatment covariates because they were measured prior to both the randomization of alphabet letters and the selection of the number of ballot pages for each district. The horizontal axis represents the number of districts. The dark shading of the horizontal bars indicates the number of districts in which voters saw the candidate on the first page, whereas the grey shading corresponds to the districts in which the candidate was not listed on the first ballot.
The figure suggests that the California alphabet lottery does not result in complete randomization of page placement. Robinson, for example, who is first in the randomized alphabet and represented by the top horizontal bar as candidate 1, appears on the first page in only 6 multi-page districts.
Schwarzenegger, who is candidate 74, is listed on the first page in 38 districts. The 25 candidates at the end of the randomized alphabet are all listed on the first page in fewer than 10 districts. Candidates are listed in order of the randomized alphabet. For each candidate, the dark shading indicates the total number of districts in which the candidate was listed on the first page. The grey shading indicates the total number of districts in which the candidate was not listed on the first page. Districts with single-page ballot are excluded from the graph as well as from our analysis. The total number of districts with multiple-page ballots is 121.
The Method
In this section, we present our approach to estimate ballot page effects. We place our analysis in the formal statistical framework of causal inference, often referred to as the Rubin causal model (e.g., Holland, 1986) . Within this framework, we describe randomization inference based on Fisher's exact test (e.g., Rosenbaum, 2002c) . The key insight is to incorporate the exact randomizationrotation procedure as a central part of statistical estimation. In addition to testing the sharp null hypothesis of no unit treatment effect, we invert Fisher's exact test to obtain the nonparametric estimates of the confidence intervals. The inversion can also be used to estimate the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the sampling distribution of the ballot page effects estimator for each candidate. We use a simple extension of the bisection algorithm to conduct such distribution-free inferences.
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The Framework of Causal Inference
We conduct our analysis separately for each of the 135 candidates. For each candidate, we observe vote shares for 121 districts with multi-page ballots. Let y i denote the observed vote share for the ith district. For each district i = 1, 2, . . . , 121, we define two potential outcomes, Y 1i and Y 0i ∈ [0, 1].
Y 1i denotes the potential vote share in district i when the candidate is placed on the first page of the ballot, while Y 0i represents the potential vote share in district i when the candidate is not on the first page. We use the indicator variable, T i ∈ {0, 1}, to denote the treatment status in district i. T i is equal to 1 if the candidate was listed on the first page, and T i = 0 otherwise. Thus, the observed outcome variable is a function of the treatment variable and potential outcomes,
We use upper case letters to stress that Y i is a random variable, while the actual observed outcome y i is its realization (a fixed quantity) and hence represented by a lower case letter. The fundamental problem of causal inference is that we only observe one of the two potential outcomes (Holland, 1986) .
Instead of estimating the effect of being listed on the first page, it may also be possible to analyze the effect of being listed on each page as a multi-treatment regime by assuming a constant additive treatment effect (see e.g., Angrist and Imbens, 1995; Imai and van Dyk, 2004; Imbens and Rosenbaum, 2005) . However, this assumption is implausible, since the effect of being listed on the first versus the second page, for example, may well differ from the effect of being listed on the fifth versus the sixth page (see e.g., Ho and Imai, 2004) . Alternatively, one might dichotomize the treatment for each position, which is a straightforward extension of our approach. Similarly, if the data were available, one might also estimate the vector of potential outcomes for page placement and the ballot order within each page. Our adopted framework of potential outcomes implicitly makes the following assumption (Cox, 1958; Rubin, 1990) , Assumption 1 (No Interference Among Units) The potential outcomes of one unit do not depend on the treatment of other units.
In our application, making this assumption implies that potential vote shares of a candidate in 8 one district do not depend on the same candidate's ballot placement in another district. This is likely to hold since voters usually do not see ballots of other districts and hence are unlikely to be affected by them.
Assumption 1 would be violated if we consider joint vote shares of all 135 candidates, which must sum to unity within each district. To model candidates jointly, however, would imply an extremely large number of missing potential outcomes requiring strong assumptions for identification (e.g., that the treatment effect of one candidate draws votes proportionally from all other candidates).
Since such assumptions are implausible in this application, we focus on the estimation of a separate causal effect for each candidate, which makes Assumption 1 more reasonable.
Within this framework of causal inference, we consider in-sample inferences where Y 1i and Y 0i are assumed to be fixed (but not necessarily observed) quantities. From this perspective, the treatment variable T i is the only random variable and, as explained below, it completely determines the reference distributions of test statistics. (Since Y i is a function of T i , it is also a random variable.)
Given this setup, we define the unit ballot page effect (or treatment effect) in the ith district as
which is also a fixed quantity. In order to make inferences beyond the sample at hand, researchers typically consider a repeated sampling process and treat Y 1i and Y 0i as random variables (e.g., Imbens, 2004) . In this application, we are primarily concerned with in-sample causal inferences.
Substantively, this means that we investigate only the causal effects in the 2003 recall election. Since an unprecedented number of candidates competed in the recall election and yielded unusually high media coverage, a population for which out-of-sample inferences are made may be difficult to define.
Randomization Inference via Fisher's Exact Test
When making in-sample causal inferences via Fisher's exact test, we use the null hypothesis about the unit ballot page effect defined in equation (1). In particular, we hypothesize that the unit treatment effect is zero for all districts,
which indicates that (potential) candidate vote shares in each district are the same irrespective of his/her page placement. This null hypothesis said to be sharp because it is about the treatment effect of each observation rather than its average over a group of observations.
Under the sharp null hypothesis, all potential outcomes are known exactly. For example, consider the units in the treatment group. For these units, we observe one of the fixed potential outcomes under the treatment, i.e., y i = Y 1i , but Y 0i is missing. Under the null hypothesis, however, the missing outcome is equal to the observed outcome, Y 0i = y i (similarly, Y 1i = y i for the control units). Given this setup, we formulate the following test statistic, W D (T ), which corresponds to the differences-in-means estimator for the sample average treatment effect,
where
, and N 0 = 121 − N 1 . Alternatively, we also formulate a covariate-adjusted test statistic by linear least squares (Rosenbaum, 2002b) ,
where y = (y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y 121 ), M = I − X(X X) −1 X , and X is the matrix of pretreatment covariates. We denote the observed value of these statistics as W D (t) and W L (t) with the observed treatment status t = (t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t 121 ). Other potential test statistics that may be used here include the median test statistic and various rank sum statistics (e.g., Wilcoxon, 1945) among others (see Section 4.2). We choose W D (T ) and W L (T ) because they correspond to conventional estimators discussed in Section 4.3, where we investigate differences between randomization inference and conventional estimators based on these identical test statistics. The two statistics also represent our scientific quantity of interest, providing an intuitive interpretation.
The notations, W D (T ) and W L (T ), emphasize the fact that under the null hypothesis, only the treatment variable T is random. Therefore, the reference distributions of the test statistics are completely determined by that of T . We assume knowledge of random assignment, Assumption 2 (Known Random Assignment) Treatment is randomly assigned by a known
In the context of the recall election, this also implies that county page formats are independent of the randomized alphabet. This would be violated if county officials decide ballot pages based on each election's randomized alphabet. Such a scenario is unlikely, since the number of possible ballot pages are primarily driven by the type of voting technology (Kershaw, 2003) . Since voting technology is exogenous to the randomization (e.g., officials did not change voting technology after observing that Schwarzenegger was randomized to the end of the alphabet), the assumption is likely to hold. With the knowledge of the assignment mechanism, the exact distribution of W under the null hypothesis can be derived. The exact (one-tailed) p-values are then defined by,
The null hypothesis is rejected when this p-value is less than a predetermined significance level. In principle, this test is exact in the sense that no approximation is necessary. As explained below, however, we approximate this exact distribution of test statistics with a Monte Carlo simulation.
The test is also distribution-free because it does not impose distributional assumptions that are usually invoked to approximate the reference distribution.
In our application, the California alphabet lottery procedure defines the random treatment assignment and hence determines the exact distribution of the test statistic. As described in Section 2, treatment assignment in each district is determined systematically once the alphabet letters are randomized. Directly incorporating this randomization procedure may be difficult in standard parametric inferences. Although there are 135 ways to order a particular candidate in the first district, each order is not equally likely. Moreover, with 135 candidates and 121 districts, systematic rotation does not assure that each candidate is placed in the same position with equal probability in each district. Indeed, as shown in Section 2.2, there is substantial variation in the page placement of candidates. Accounting for such complications may be difficult, particularly when estimating the variances of conventional estimators such as least squares and difference-inmeans. A similar situation arises in systematic sampling methods in the context of survey sampling where single randomization is followed by systematic rotation (e.g., Cochran, 1977) .
In contrast, Fisher's exact test permits us to directly incorporate the particular randomization procedure; i.e., the systematic rotation of the treatment after a random start. In natural experiments, such deviations from simple random assignment may be common (see e.g., Starr, 1997 by calculating the value they take given each ordering of alphabet letters.
In this application, the expressions in equation (5) are difficult to evaluate analytically because of the complex nature of the treatment assignment rule used for California statewide elections.
Moreover, the number of permutations produced by alphabet randomization is large. Therefore, we use the following Monte Carlo approximation,
where T (j) is the jth draw of the random variable from its known distribution, I(·) is the indicator function, and m = 10, 000 is the total number of draws to approximate the distribution. That is, we randomly order alphabet letters and then deterministically obtain the treatment assignment for each district. The exact same procedure can be used to approximate Pr(
testing various values of m, we find that 10, 000 is sufficiently large enough to provide a reliable approximation.
Inverting the Test
In-sample randomization inference via Fisher's exact test can be further extended by inverting the test. Inverting the test is a standard way to obtain the confidence intervals (e.g., Cox and Hinkley, 1979) . The resulting confidence intervals based on Fisher's exact test are distribution-free and have accurate coverage probabilities.
To invert the test, we first assert a general null hypothesis, under which, the unit treatment effect is assumed to be constant across all units in the sample,
for some constant τ 0 . Under this sharp null hypothesis, missing potential outcomes are known exactly as before. For example, for the units in the treatment group, the missing outcome can be computed by Y 0i = y i − τ 0 under the null hypothesis (similarly, Y 1i = y i + τ 0 for the units in the control group). Given this sharp null hypothesis, we generalize our test statistic, W D (T ), to
incorporate arbitrary values of τ 0 .
The test statistic in equation (3), which is based on the difference-in-means estimator, is simply a special case of W D τ 0 (T ) when τ 0 = 0. The covariate-adjusted analogue is,
where each element of y * is y
The test statistic in equation (4), which is based on the linear least squares, can be obtained by setting τ 0 = 0. Finally, we denote the observed values of the test statistics by W D τ 0 (t) and W L τ 0 (t).
As before, the treatment assignment, T i , is the only random variable and everything else is fixed under the sharp null hypothesis. Therefore, the distribution of the test statistics under any null value τ 0 is solely determined by that of T i . Then, our level α hypothesis test (two-tailed) is described by the following decision rule,
where A D α (τ 0 ) denotes the acceptance region of the test for the difference-in-means test statistic,
, can be defined in the same way.
Within this general setup, we obtain the (1 − α) confidence intervals of τ by inverting the test.
Here, we describe our method using the test statistic, W D τ 0 (T ). The same procedure can be used 13 for W L τ 0 (T ). First, we note that the (1 − α) confidence set is given by C α (t) = {τ : t ∈ A D α (τ )}.
Second, define the (1 − α) confidence interval as the shortest interval that includes the (1 − α) confidence set. Then, the confidence interval can be computed by identifying the upper and lower
Finally, in addition to the confidence interval given a particular value of α, we also obtain the approximate CDF of the sampling distribution (generated by the alphabet randomization) for the ballot page effect estimator by changing the value of α from 0 to 0.5 and computing τ U and τ L for each value of α. To obtain upper and lower bounds of confidence intervals, we use a simple extension of the bisection algorithm (e.g., Lange, 1999) , for which details may be found in the Appendix.
Lastly, note that while this application of Fisher's exact test allows for continuous outcomes and a large variety of treatment assignment mechanisms, the exact test is more commonly used in testing the equality of two independent binomial proportions. The fundamental idea of the generalized application already existed in Fisher (1935) and Kempthorne (1952) .
Analysis of the 2003 California Recall Election
In this section, we analyze our dataset of the 2003 California Recall election. We first present the results based on randomization inference, which directly incorporates the known treatment assignment mechanism. We also explore the possibilities of using other test statistics and relaxing the constant additive treatment effect assumption. Finally, we compare these results with conventional estimators, which do not incorporate the randomization procedure, and empirically examine the consequences of ignoring the assignment mechanism.
Randomization Inference
We first test the sharp null hypothesis of no unit treatment effect as described in Section 3.2. Here, we follow others (e.g., Rosenbaum, 2002c) and use the one- To further illustrate these results, Figure 3 presents the p-values from Fisher's exact test in the exactly same manner as Figure 2 except that we test the null hypothesis of no effect on selected pretreatment variables rather than on candidates' vote shares. We present the results for three covariates (number of registered voters, proportion male, and Republican vote share in 2002
Registered Voters
Gubernatorial election). Since the treatment is randomized, we should expect no significant page effects on these variables since they were measured prior to the randomization of the treatment and the determination of the exact ballot format. Under the sharp null hypothesis of no page effects, the p-values are expected to be distributed uniformly, roughly following the diagonal line. Figure 3 shows that as expected, these pretreatment variables are not affected by the page placement of candidates. In contrast, Figure 2 shows that for a number of minor candidates, their page placement have statistically significant effect on their vote share.
Next, we invert Fisher's exact test to compute nonparametric confidence intervals. Figure 4 presents 90, 80, 70, and 60% confidence intervals obtained from the inversion of equation (10). For 16 candidates, the 90% confidence intervals include the entire sample space, indicating that the data contain no information about the effects of page placement for these candidates. (For one candidate only the upper bound is defined.) The reason is that these candidates (a) appeared on the first page of multi-page ballots in a very small number of districts since they were listed near the end of the candidate order for the first district (see Figure 1 other California elections.
Sensitivity Analyses
In this section, we conduct two kinds of sensitivity analyses. First, we explore the possibility of relaxing the assumption of constant additive treatment effect. So far, our analysis assumed that the ballot page effect for a particular candidate is constant across districts. While this assumption is shared by common parametric and nonparametric models (see Rosenbaum, 2002b, p.289) , it may not be realistic in our application given the heterogeneity of California districts. Therefore, we estimate nonparametric confidence intervals for different subsets of the sample (see Rosenbaum, 2002b, pp.322-324 for a more general discussion on this assumption). Differences of confidence intervals across those subsamples would suggest that the constant additive treatment effect assumption may be violated. Republican (Democratic) voters exceeds the proportion of Democratic (Republican) voters. The results show that for major candidates, the effect sizes are similar across Republican and Democratic districts and large portions of the two estimated confidence intervals overlap with one another. For minor candidates, the story is similar although there appears to be a noticeable difference between the two types of districts for Ramirez. With the exception of Ramirez, the constant additive treatment effect assumption appears to be plausible at least with respect to these candidates and partisanship of the district.
We also attempted to test effects conditional on the total number of pages in a district, given the possibility that effects may not be similar when there are two pages compared to more. Unfortunately, identifying such heterogeneous effects was not possible since in a number of districts where the total number of ballot pages exceeds two, candidates are not listed first for many permutations. We also investigated heterogeneity of treatment effects of candidates by conducting rank tests on the estimated p-values by race and gender of candidates. We find that page effects do not appear to be related to candidate gender or race.
Second, we examine the sensitivity of randomization inference to the choice of test statistics. In particular, we consider rank sum and median test statistics in addition to the difference-in-means and least squares test statistics. The rank sum test statistic is defined as 
Comparison with Conventional Estimators
Finally, we compare randomization inference with conventional estimators that do not fully incorporate the treatment assignment mechanism. Conventional analyses might assume complete or simple randomization of treatment assignment and compute mean differences in vote shares between when a candidate was listed on the first page and when not (Neyman, 1923) . Confidence intervals are often obtained via the normal approximation. This strategy may be reasonable in typical elections where the number of candidates is small relative to the number of districts (Ho and Imai, 2004) . However, with 135 candidates running in the recall election of 2003, complete randomization is not assured. Some candidates may be primarily listed on the first page in liberal Northern California, while listed primarily on later pages of the ballot in conservative Southern California.
As a result, estimates that assume complete randomization, ignoring the randomization-rotation procedure, may be confounded. Moreover, standard variance calculations that assume simple random assignment are invalid because of the systematic rotation of the California alphabet lottery.
This means that unlike randomization inference, the confidence intervals based on conventional estimators are likely to have incorrect coverage probabilities.
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We investigate how randomization inference compares to two conventional estimators: linear least squares, which models vote shares, and the binomial generalized linear model (GLM) with logit link and overdispersion, which models vote counts (McCullagh and Nelder, 1989) . The comparison is made twice, with and without covariates, in order to account for potential confounding effects due to incomplete randomization. The comparison between least squares and randomization inference is based on identical test statistics and the same covariate set as defined in Section 2.2. The difference is that the reference distribution is either the randomization distribution or the asymptotic normal approximation based on the linear model. We also note that these two conventional estimators may not be the best available parametric methods. Rather, we use them merely to compare the results of randomization inference with the estimators that are frequently used by applied researchers.
The upper part of Table 4 .3 presents 90% confidence intervals from randomization inference and two conventional parametric analyses for the top three candidates. The results with and without covariate adjustment are shown in the right and left panels, respectively. Schwarzenegger was the Republican winner of the election and Bustamante was its runner-up and the main Democratic candidate. The results show appreciable differences between randomization inference and conventional estimators. For example, the estimates based on least squares regression without covariates imply that Schwarzenegger gained roughly 1 to 10 percentage points due to being on the first page. In contrast, the confidence interval based on randomization inference using the same test statistic is significantly wider and contains the origin. Even when controlling for the covariates, the confidence intervals based on the two methods differ significantly for Schwarzenegger. We find similar differences between randomization inference and the binomial GLM. When controlling for the covariates, the result of the binomial GLM indicates that Schwarzenegger might have lost votes by 2 to 5 percentage points when being listed on the first page. The results for Bustamante and McClintock differ less across three methods than those for Schwarzenegger. Nevertheless, we observe some noticeable differences; for example, when controlling for the covariates, the binomial GLM shows a significant positive effect for Bustamante, while randomization inference and least squares regression do not.
The lower part of 59 (44%) 77 (57%) 59 (44%) 64 ( 108 (80%) 88 (65%) 74 (55%) 108 (80%) Rosenbaum, 2005) . In our application, this is true for the candidates whose name appear on the first ballot page in only a handful of districts. In contrast, the conventional estimators identify significant effects for several of these candidates by making parametric assumptions.
In general, conventional parametric confidence intervals tend to be shorter compared to the nonparametric counterparts. Figure 7 compares the log length of the 90% parametric (linear least squares with and without covariates) and corresponding 90% nonparametric confidence intervals.
We exclude those candidates for whom nonparametric confidence intervals are not identified. For comparison, we also conduct randomization inference with covariate adjustment from equation (9).
Irrespective of whether the covariates are included, the length of the parametric confidence intervals tends to be substantially shorter than the nonparametric counterparts. The few dots below the 45 degree line represent candidates for whom the nonparametric confidence interval is shorter than the parametric counterpart. These candidates were listed on the first page in very few districts.
Finally, we compute the CDF of sampling distribution for the causal effect estimator using randomization inference as described in Section 3.3. The CDFs are step functions because the total number of treatment assignment combinations is finite. As before, we use the alphabet letters as units of randomization following the actual procedure of the recall election. For comparison, we also compute the CDFs using the candidates as units of randomization, while maintaining the rotation procedure. The advantage of the latter is that it makes exact computation possible. Figure 8 presents the nonparametric CDFs for Schwarzenegger with and without covariate adjustment. The approximated CDFs based on candidate and alphabet randomization trail each other closely in both panels, suggesting that for Schwarzenegger there is little lost by using candidates rather than alphabet letters as the unit of randomization so long as the rotation procedure is maintained. The sampling distribution of the treatment effect estimator based on randomization inference does not closely follow a normal distribution. The figure also compares the nonparametric estimate of CDF with its parametric counterparts based on the normal approximation from linear least squares regressions (with and without covariate adjustment). These parametric estimates deviate significantly from the nonparametric estimates, suggesting that the large-sample normal approximation may not be appropriate in this application.
While randomization inference has the virtue of being able to directly incorporate the complex randomization-rotation system, it is also possible to incorporate unequal probability treatment assignment with certain conventional estimators. For example, one may employ the adjustment by calculating the propensity score (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) , i.e., the probability of being listed on the first page, for each district. In our application, the Monte Carlo approximation of true propensity score can be computed by capitalizing on the randomization-rotation procedure as done for randomization inference. The resulting propensity score has the average standard deviation of 0.2 per candidate, confirming that the California alphabet lottery results in the unequal probability treatment. Given this propensity score, we apply the Horvitz-Thompson estimator which uses the inverse of the propensity score as a weight (Horvitz and Thompson, 1952; Imbens, 2000) .
While this estimator incorporates unequal probability assignment of the randomization, there are still difficulties in computing variance estimates. In particular, the joint inclusion probabilities must be non-zero in order to obtain an unbiased estimate of the variance estimate of the HorvitzThompson estimator (e.g., Cochran, 1977, p.261) . However, as is well known in the systematic survey sampling literature and is the case in our application, some of the joint inclusion proba-bilities, which correspond to the joint probability of being listed on the first page for each pair of districts in our application, are zero when a randomization-rotation procedure is employed (e.g., Tillé 1996; Lohr 1999, pp.197-198; Chang and Huang 2000) . The weighting estimator also tends to give a wider confidence intervals. For example, if we compute the confidence interval by ignoring the rotation procedure (i.e., assuming the the joint inclusion probability equals the product of two marginal probabilities as done in Hartley and Rao (1962) ), we find that the resulting 90% confidence intervals contain the origin for all 135 candidates.
Conclusion
In this article, we have illustrated how Fisher's exact test can be applied to randomized natural experiments in order to draw (nonparametric) randomization inference. 
where τ U and τ L are upper and lower bounds of the confidence set. To solve these nonlinear equations, we use a simple extension of the bisection algorithm, which in our current application is more appropriate than other nonlinear optimization techniques such as Newton-Raphson algorithms. This is because the latter methods require the objective functions to be continuous and/or differentiable, while f (·) and g(·) are discrete in our application. Our extension here is that we use Monte Carlo simulation to approximate the values of the functions, f (·) and g(·), whose exact evaluations are computationally demanding. To approximate the nonparametric CDF, we repeat this procedure for various values of α between 0 and 0.5.
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